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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEP 1 9 2007

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In reply refer to: 1-35298/77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN & NATO AFFAIRS DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR POLICY PLANS & NSC AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: U.S. National Strategy (Presidential Directive/NSC-18) (PD/NSC-18) (P)

(U) The attachment forwards pertinent extracts of Presidential determinations on the subject.

(U) The attachment is CLOSE HOLD and reproduction of it in whole or in part is prohibited. A signature record of disclosure (SD Form 194) shall be maintained and disclosure will be on the basis of a genuine need to know only.

(U) It is requested that the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs assume primary OSD responsibility for actions directed by this Presidential Directive/NSC.

WALTER SLOCOMBE

Acting Assistant Socretary of Defense International Security Affairs

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Enclosure a/s

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Prep: COL Eiler/PN/hr/79349/8/30/77

Classified by Zbigniew Brzezinski EXEMPT PROTECTION SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11852. EXEMPTION CATAGORY 3

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In reply refer to: 1-35298/77

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING AMBASSADOR ROBERT W. KOMER, SPECIAL CONSULTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ON NATO AFFAIRS ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ATOMIC ENERGY)

SUBJECT: U.S. National Strategy (Presidential Directive/NSC-18) (PD/NSC-18) (C)

(U) The attachment forwards pertinent extracts of Presidential determinations on the subject.

(U) The attachment is CLOSE HOLD and reproduction of it in whole or in part is prohibited. It is requested that signature record(s) of disclosure (SD Form 194 or equivalent) be maintained and that disclosure be on the basis of a genuine need to know only.

(U) OASD (ISA) has assumed primary OSD responsibility for actions directed by this Presidential Directive/NSC.

WALTER SLOCOMBE

Acting Assistant Secretary of Luiense International Security Affairs

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Enclosure a/s

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SUBJECT: U.S. National Strategy (Presidential Directive/NSC-18) (PD/NSC-18) (C), dated 24 August 1977

- (TS) The PRM/NSC-10 conclusions and the discussion of the Special Coordination Committee have been reviewed. It is clear that in the foreseeable future, US-Soviet relations will continue to be characterized by both competition and cooperation, with the attendant risk of conflict as well as the opportunity for stabilizing US-Soviet relations.
- (TS) In that competition, military aspects aside, the United States continues to enjoy a number of critical advantages: it has a more creative technological and economic system, its political structure can adapt more easily to popular demands and relies on freely given popular support, and it is supported internationally by allies and friends who genuinely share similar aspirations. In contrast, though successfully acquiring military power matching that of the United States, the Soviet Union continues to face major internal economic and national difficulties, and externally it has few genuinely committed allies while lately suffering setbacks in its relations with China, parts of Africa, and India.
- (TS) In this situation, US national strategy will be to take advantage of our relative advantages in economic strength, technological superiority and popular political support to:
 - -- Counterbalance, together with our allies and friends, by a combination of military forces, political efforts, and economic programs, Soviet military power and adverse influence in key areas, particularly Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia.
 - -- Compete politically with the Soviet Union by pursuing the basic American commitment to human rights and national independence.
 - -- Seek Soviet cooperation in resolving regional conflicts and reducing areas of tension that could lead to confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.
 - -- Advance American security interests through negotiations with the Soviet Union of adequately verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements that enhance stability and curb arms competition.

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- -- Seek to involve the Soviet Union constructively in global activities, such as economic and social developments and peaceful non-strategic trade.
- (TS) To fulfill this national strategy, the United States will maintain an overall balance of military power between the United States and its allies on the one hand and the Soviet Union and its allies on the other at least as favorable as that that now exists. In this connection, the United States will fulfill its commitment to its NATO allies to raise the level of defense spending by approximately three percent per year in real terms along with our allies.
- (TS) To carry out US national strategy, the following initial guidance regarding US military strategy, programs and policies is provided.

Strategic Force Objectives

The purpose of US strategic forces is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, upon our forces, our allies and others whose security is important to the United States and, if deterrence fails, to inflict appropriate retaliatory response on the Soviet Union. In conjunction with general purpose and theater nuclear forces, it is the further purpose of our strategic forces to enhance deterrence of non-nuclear aggression against NATO and our Asian allies.


Strategic Programs

The United States will maintain a strategic posture of essential equivalence with the Soviet Union so as to insure that the Soviet Union cannot use strategic forces for political leverage and coercion and so that the strategic balance will not deter the United States from taking conventional military action where its interests dictate.

Essential equivalence will require that advantages in strategic force characteristics enjoyed by the Soviet Union must be offset by United States advantages in strategic forces. The United States will not accept a strategic posture inferior to that of the Soviet Union.

The United States will not seek a capability for a disarming first strategic nuclear strike against Soviet strategic forces so long as the Soviet Union does not do so against us. Our posture should be designed to promote nuclear stability particularly in a crisis and to the extent possible reduce any Soviet incentive to use nuclear weapons. The US force posture should be capable of inflicting an unacceptable level of damage on the Soviet Union following a Soviet first strike.

The United States will maintain adequate command and control capability and forces to execute limited strategic employment options.



Global Contingencies

In addition, the United States will maintain a deployment force of light divisions with strategic mobility independent of overseas bases and logistical support, which includes moderate naval and tactical air forces, and limited land combat forces. These forces will be designed for use against both local forces and forces projected by the USSR based on analyses of requirements in the Middle East, the Persian Gulf, or Korea, taking into account the contribution of our friends and allies in these regions. US planning should provide that these requirements may be met by a combination of the light deployment forces, supplemented by forces in the United States, primarily oriented toward NATO defense. The 2nd Division will be oriented toward deployment in Asia but available for global contingencies as described above.

Asia

With the exception of withdrawals from Korea directed under PD/NSC-12, the United States will maintain the current level of combat forces deployed in the Western Pacific in order to preserve regional stability, to deter aggression in Korea and elsewhere, and to protect US interests and meet treaty commitments in the event of aggression.

Additional Studies

The Secretary of Defense will undertake, subject to separate instructions, a review of US targeting policy, as well as other studies; recommendations on the appropriate level of US capability to sustain a worldwide conventional war against the Soviet Union and its allies should be coordinated by the National Security Council for my decision, as per additional instructions.

Pending the conclusion of the targeting review, the US will continue to employ its strategic forces according to NSDM 242.

Otherwise, this Directive supersedes NSDM 242.

CLOSE HOLD

TOP SECTET

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